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   In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the issue of the choice of exchange rate 
regime for East Asian (EA) countries re-emerged. The crisis had demonstrated, amongst 
other things, that unilateral exchange rate regimes (including de facto dollar pegging) hadn’t 
coped very well in the 1990s faced with massive capital inflows into the region (Kwan et al., 
1998), 
 with the possible exceptions of Singapore and Taiwan.  
   The immediate response to the crisis was that a ‘corner’ solution might be better. Either 
keep convertibility and fix the currency, preferably backed up with a currency board, but 
abandon monetary independence; or keep monetary policy and convertibility but abandon 
currency management and adopt a free float. But a hard peg is perceived to be too rigid for 
most countries in EA and the potential costs of a clean float are seen to be too great for 
emerging economies with weak financial infrastructure because of the risks of serious 
currency misalignment and destabilising speculation. 
   Recognition that the corner solutions may be unattractive or not feasible for many emerging 
countries in EA has, therefore, put the emphasis back on intermediate exchange rate regimes, 
such as managed floating, some mixture of inflation targeting and exchange rate 
management, and unilateral basket regimes.
2 In the post-crisis period average currency 
volatility, both in effective terms and bilaterally against the US$, dropped substantially 
compared to the crisis period but was still higher than in the pre-crisis period, with significant 
increases for Indonesia and Thailand (Figure 1) and to some extent this has been a 
consequence of the move towards greater exchange rate flexibility,
3 with the notable 
                                                 
1 My thanks to the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Leeds for inviting me as a Visiting 
Fellow in February 2006 and to my colleagues at the Singapore Centre for Applied and Policy Economics 
(SCAPE) at the National University of Singapore for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 This includes variations on the basket, band and crawl  (Dornbusch and Park, 1998), crawling pegs and bands 
and monitoring bands (Williamson 1998b). 
3 The average standard deviations of monthly exchange rate changes for the nine EA countries in Figure 1 
increased from 0.70 to 1.10 bilaterally against the dollar, from 1.19 to 1.60 in nominal effective terms and from 
1.32 to 2.07 in real effective terms.  PETER WILSON AND HENRY NG SHANG REN 
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exception of Malaysia which joined the hard dollar peggers in September 1998 but reverted 
to a managed float in 2005. Korea (1998), Thailand (2000), Indonesia (2000) and the 
Philippines (2002) all adopted de jure inflation targeting regimes over this period and 
Singapore was prepared to widen its target exchange rate policy band when necessary to 
adjust to external shocks. 
   An underlying problem for EA from the exchange rate point of view is that the diversity of 
exchange rate regimes in the region transmits fluctuations in major currencies into 
fluctuations in bilateral regional exchange rates and alters relative competitiveness. In 
particular, a country which de facto pegs more tightly against the US dollar compared to its 
export competitors finds itself unable to compete when the dollar appreciates strongly against 
the yen and the euro.
4  
   There is an interesting parallel here with European experience, since it was only after the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s and the move to generalized 
floating, which presented a choice between returning to a dollar peg or pegging to a regional 
anchor, that serious consideration was given to monetary cooperation. The social costs of 
floating exchange rates together with the perceived costs of intra-bloc instability produced 
first the ‘snake in the tunnel’, the European Monetary System in 1979, and a de facto anchor 
to the Deutsche mark in the 1980s to capture the benefits of the low German inflation rate. In 
the early stages of exchange rate cooperation, the desire to anchor price levels was probably 
not the key driving force. More important was the perceived threat that intra-European 
exchange rate fluctuations posed to the broader process of trade and financial integration 
which had been proceeding well since 1960  
   A relatively simple solution is for each country to adopt a unilateral basket peg (UBP). This 
would automatically provide some insulation against movements in the major currencies, 
especially the dollar/yen rate, and reduce volatility in the nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) and real effective exchange rate (REER). It is also relevant to countries with 
reasonably diversified trade patterns and thus no obvious single candidate for an exchange 
rate anchor.
5 However, insofar as trade structures, and therefore the baskets, would differ 
amongst the nine EA countries (EA9), UBPs will not necessarily reduce intra-EA exchange 
rate volatility caused by fluctuations in the currencies of their respective trading partners, 
                                                 
4 A classic case of this ‘third currency’ effect was in April 1995 when the dollar appreciated sharply against the 
yen thereby reducing the competitiveness of Asian countries relative to Japan and the European Union (EU).  
5 As Rajan (2002) has argued, the weakness of pegging to one currency is not the same thing as the weakness of 
pegging in general. If soft pegging to the US dollar is sub-optimal then it would be better to adopt a more THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
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with consequences for exports if the EA countries concerned are close competitors. This is, 
therefore, one empirical question which can be addressed through counterfactual analysis. 
   A second, and closely related question, is the trade-off between the benefits of a UBP in 
reducing effective exchange rate volatility for a specific country and the potential increase in 
volatility against a particular major currency, such as the US dollar, and therefore against 
other competitors in the EA bloc. The outcome is hard to predict ex ante since it depends on 
the composition of the baskets for each country and on the magnitude of actual exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
   An alternative approach, which gained support after the Asian financial crisis, is for EA to 
pursue closer monetary and exchange rate cooperation by adopting a common peg to the U. 
S. dollar, the yen, or a basket of major currencies (Williamson, 1998a), or by reproducing an 
Asian analogue of the European Monetary System’s multilateral currency grid . A common 
basket peg (CBP) is particularly attractive since by using both common weights and a basket 
it would minimize the effects of fluctuations in major currencies for countries which have 
reasonably diversified trade patterns and thus no obvious candidate for an anchor, and at the 
same time minimize intra-EA exchange rate instability. The basket can be used to stabilize 
the NEER or REER with a band to adjust for misalignments, and the collective weights 
would obviate the problem of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ competitive devaluations.
6  
   Of course for a CBP to be workable in a world of high capital mobility there will have to be 
sufficient convergence of economic fundamentals and policy objectives and there are 
technical considerations in the choice of common weights.
7 These weights are unlikely to 
match exactly the optimal weights in a country’s own basket, so the common NEER or REER 
may be too strong or too weak for some countries and have different outcomes for effective 
and bilateral volatility.
8 Again, the trade-off between the UBP and the CBP is an empirical 
question which can also be examined through counterfactual analysis. 
   The objective of this paper is to address some of these counterfactuals by looking at the 
impact of alternative exchange rate regimes on the volatility of the NEER and the bilateral 
                                                                                                                                                     
flexible peg against a diversified basket with suitable variability in the width of the band or in the precise 
operation of the regime to suit the needs of individual countries.  
6 For a discussion of collective solutions in the context of closer monetary and exchange rate cooperation in EA, 
see Wilson (2005, 2006) and for the basket peg, in particular, Williamson (2005). The progress in EA monetary 
and financial cooperation is reviewed in Rajan (2006). 
7 Even if there is insufficient enthusiasm for a fully-fledged CBP in EA in the near future, this does not rule out 
the use of a common basket as a monitoring device or the creation of a basket-based Asian Currency Unit as a 
‘parallel currency’ to encourage intra-regional trade and investment and eventual monetary unification, as 
suggested by Eichengreen (2006). 
8 See Bird and Rajan (2002). PETER WILSON AND HENRY NG SHANG REN 
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rate against the US$ for nine EA countries after the Asian financial crisis.
 9 Our 
counterfactuals include a UBP, a CBP, and a hard peg against the US$, but in contrast to 
previous counterfactual exercises, such as Williamson (1998a) and Ohno (1999) which 
compute the weights for effective exchange rates on the basis of simple bloc aggregates, we 
apply a more disaggregated methodology using a larger number of trade partners. We also 
utilize ARCH/GARCH techniques to obtain estimates of heteroskedastic variances to better 
capture the time-varying characteristics of volatility for the actual and simulated exchange 
rate regimes.  
   Our results confirm that mean exchange rate volatility for EA countries after the Asian 
financial crisis is substantially higher than pre-crisis, about twice for the NEER and almost 
four times for bilateral rates against the dollar. A UBP would minimize effective exchange 
rate volatility for all countries and provides the highest regime gains compared to actual. 
Although the gains for a CBP are always less than those for a UBP the absolute differences 
between the two regimes appear to be small.  In terms of bilateral exchange rates against the 
dollar the gains from a UBP or CBP could also be quite significant for the non-dollar peggers 
since a fall in effective instability would be accompanied by a fall in bilateral instability.  
   We begin in 2 with some background on the literature focusing on the choice of exchange 
rate regime in the context of exchange rate volatility. This is followed in 3 with a discussion 
of the methodology which underpins our counterfactual experiments in relation to previous 
work. Our empirical results are presented in 4 and our key findings are then brought together 
in the form of a conclusion. 
 
2. EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY AND THE CHOICE OF REGIME 
 
   One aspect of the choice of exchange rate regime is its implications for the magnitude of 
exchange rate volatility and the transmission of this volatility into the domestic economy.
10 
There is now a substantial literature looking at the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade 
and capital flows. For comprehensive surveys see Cote (1994), Bachetta and Van Winloop 
(2000) and more recently, McKenzie (1999). The evidence appears to be very mixed, but 
according to McKenzie, recent empirical studies have had “greater success in deriving a 
statistically significant relationship between volatility and trade” (p. 100). Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) reach a similar conclusion. The application of trade gravity models (Rose 2000) also 
                                                 
9 Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
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suggests that exchange rate volatility might have a negative, albeit small, effect on trade. On 
the other hand, a comprehensive study by the International Monetary Fund (Clark et. al, 2004) 
found no robust negative effect between exchange rate volatility and trade flows. Indeed, 
tying up exchange rates prematurely could even increase instability if EA has not reached a 
sufficient level of economic convergence according to the standard optimum currency criteria. 
   A related issue is whether exchange rate volatility varies systematically across exchange 
rate regimes. According to Flood and Rose (1999) it does not.
11 This does not rule out, 
however, the possibility that a particular regime has worked well for a given country. Khor et 
al. (2007), for example, make the case that Singapore’s exchange rate-centred monetary 
policy since 1981, based on a basket, band and crawl, has been successful in preventing 
short-term external shocks, including financial instability, from adversely affecting real 
domestic variables and at the same time has left sufficient flexibility to prevent misalignment.   
   The starting-point for our analysis is the counterfactuals carried out on EA countries for the 
period before the Asian financial crisis by Williamson (1998a) and Ohno (1999).  
Williamson conducted an experiment for nine EA countries, which he assumed to be close 
competitors, between the end of 1994 and April 1995 when the yen appreciated sharply 
against the dollar. Most EA countries stayed with the dollar and so experienced a large actual 
fall in their NEER, more than they would have wanted. A UBP, by definition would have 
meant zero variation in the NEER but significant instability (cumulative sum of the monthly 
percentage change) bilaterally against the dollar and thus relative to each other. A CBP, on 
the other hand, with weights based on common extra-regional trade would have meant an 
identical 9.8 per cent appreciation of all EA currencies against the dollar and modest changes 
in NEERs, and the exact composition of the basket was not crucial for obtaining the benefits 
of insulation. He concluded that a CBP which reflects  the EA countries’ average trade 
patterns, would produce the same result as UBPs in terms of stabilizing the NEER against 
volatility in third currency exchange rates, but with the advantage of eliminating intra-EA 
exchange rate volatility.  
   Ohno’s (1999) counterfactuals were based on 10 EA countries using monthly data over the 
period January 1990 to June 1997. He finds that there are hardly any differences between a 
CBP and a UBP in terms of the standard deviation of the level of the CPI based REER. 
                                                                                                                                                     
10 For a discussion of the spectrum of exchange rate regimes, see Frankel (1999). 
11 Although Rose (2006) finds that inflation targeting countries typically (though insignificantly) have lower 
exchange rate volatility between 1990 and 2005 than for other regimes.  PETER WILSON AND HENRY NG SHANG REN 
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Furthermore, only Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Taiwan would benefit from either a 
UBP or a CBP in terms of reducing instability compared to actual. 
   Both the Williamson and Ohno counterfactuals use simple trade weights (exports plus 
imports). For Williamson the weights for his NEER and UBPs are based on three blocs: the 
United States, Japan and Western Europe, and he computes his common basket peg using the 
weighted average of the extra-regional trade of the EA countries, assigning the weights to the 
3 blocs in a fashion similar to the unilateral basket pegs. Ohno uses a larger number (30) of 
trading partners which are common to all the EA countries to calculate his REER instead of 
just 3 blocs.  But his computations of the unilateral and common basket pegs contain only 
three currencies: the U.S dollar, yen and the European Currency Unit.   
   Our analysis will apply a more detailed methodology for calculating the weights for the 
NEER and basket pegs, cover the post-crisis period, and utilize a more time sensitive measure 
of volatility. In addition, we will include a hypothetical hard peg to broaden the spectrum of 




   a. Sample and Time Period 
   Our sample comprises China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. The counterfactuals are computed between February 1998 
and March 2003 which enables us to go beyond the 4 months used in the Williamson (1998a) 
experiments and to extend Ohno’s (1999) study of the pre-crisis period to the post crisis era.  
A problem is how to interpret the results for Malaysia in the post crisis period given its 
decision to peg the ringgit to the US dollar in September 1998 (reverting to a managed float 
in 2005) following a period of high volatility. Clearly, if the whole post-crisis period is used 
Malaysia is a relatively high volatility country but after September 1998 it effectively joined 
the dollar peggers and the results would be more akin to those for China and Hong Kong. 
Since the purpose of the present paper is to compare exchange rate regimes across the 
country sample and there is no good reason to begin the post-crisis period to coincide with a 
regime change in any one country, we decided to stick with our original periods, but the 
results for Malaysia need to be interpreted in this light.    
 
   b. Effective Exchange Rates THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
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   The NEER for a country measures the value of that country’s currency against a basket of 
other currencies and is a weighted average exchange rate against the other currencies in the 
basket, expressed as an index relative to a base date. The REER is corrected for relative 
inflation between the home country and its trading partners. The weights used are often based 
on trade flows, thus enabling the REER to act as an indicator of competitiveness, in the sense 
that a rise indicates an appreciation of the home country’s real exchange rate relative to its 
trading partners.
12 Import weights are fairly easy to compute since they are based on bilateral 
imports. However, export weights are more complex and can be computed in a number of 
ways.
13 The bilateral export weighting system used by Williamson (1998a) and Ohno (1999) 
is the simplest but does not account for indirect competition between trading partners in third 
markets. A multilateral export weighting system computes the weights on the basis of a 
competing country’s share of exports in world trade, thus factoring in competition in third 
markets, but ignores the specific export markets of individual countries and may lead to an 
overestimation of the importance of small economies which trade amongst themselves, but 
have large export sectors.  
   The weights used for the computations of the NEER and REER in this paper were kindly 
supplied by Dominique Desruelle and are based on geometric averages and follow the 
methodology set out in the International Monetary Fund’s Information Notice System (see 
Zanello and Desruelle, 1997). A double weighting system is employed to capture both direct 
and third-market competition
 and the weights are calculated separately for trade in 
manufactures, non-oil primary commodities, and tourism services and are then aggregated.
14 
The impact of seasonal variation in prices on the computed REER was removed by adjusting 
the CPI using the X-12-ARIMA approach. Despite its well-known drawbacks, we use the 
CPI to compute the monthly REER for the graphics in Figure 1 since CPI data is easily 
obtained and can be used as a basis for REER comparison across the different EA countries.
15 
Both the NEER and REER are computed using July 1995 as the base month, and the weights 
                                                 
12 Note that from the point of view of an ‘optimal basket’ for a country with significant capital inflows, a trade-
weighted basket need not be optimal. See Yoshino et al. (2004). 
13 For a discussion of these problems, see Lafrance et al. (1998). 
14 The geometric average is preferred to the arithmetic average as there could be distortions in the arithmetic 
index when the base period is changed, and percentage changes in an arithmetic index will differ in size 
depending on whether bilateral exchange rates are defined in units of home currency per foreign currency unit or 
vice versa (Ellis, 2001). 
15 For the pros and cons of different price indices, see Kipici and Kesriyeli (1997),  Lafrance et al. (1998) and 
Abeysinghe and Wilson (2002). PETER WILSON AND HENRY NG SHANG REN 
  8
were derived from data between 1988 and 1990.
 16 A rise in the NEER and REER signifies an 
appreciation of the home country’s nominal and real exchange rate respectively.   
 
   c. Volatility Measures 
   There is no unique measure of volatility but the ARCH (Engle, 1982) and the GARCH 
(Bollerslev, 1986) estimates specifically allow heteroskedasticity in the variance to capture 
periods of tranquillity and volatility in a time series.
17 Hence to measure volatility in the 
actual and hypothetical regimes we compute the conditional (heteroskedastic) variance (CV) 
in logs of first differences using an ARCH-GARCH modelling strategy.
18 More details of the 
procedures adopted are given in an appendix. 
 
   d. Counterfactuals 
   Counterfactual exercises are carried out for all EA9 countries using the methodology 
originally set out by Takagi (1986). The hypothetical regimes include a UBP, a CBP and a 
hard peg (HP) against the US dollar. The hard peg is assumed to have no band width and the 
rate to peg a country’s currency to the dollar is based on the average bilateral exchange rate 
with the dollar from January to June 1994. Since we are concerned with volatility in the 
NEER and bilateral exchange rates and not the optimal rate to peg to the dollar, pegging at an 
arbitrary rate will not affect the volatility of the NEER since it is expressed in terms of an 
index (July 1995=100), and the volatility of bilateral exchange rates will be zero regardless of 
the rate at which the currency is pegged. The currency weights for the UBPs are chosen be 
the same as those used in the compilation of the NEER and REER based on the individual 
trading partners of the respective countries. The computations for the common basket peg are 
carried out in a similar fashion but the weights are obtained by taking the weighted average of 
the weights assigned to the common trade partners of all the EA9 countries.  
   Of course these counterfactuals capture only one dimension of the choice of exchange rate 
regime insofar as they focus on the effects of alternative regimes on the stability of nominal 
exchange rates compared to actual in ‘normal’ times. They are not concerned with the 
                                                 
16  The weights here are fixed and ideally they should be updated regularly, but empirical work by Chinn (2002) 
suggests that fixed weight and variable weight REERs tend to move closely together. 
17 Using standard deviations of changes in exchange rates tends to capture short-term instability, especially if 
high frequency data is used, while standard deviations of levels of exchange rates are more indicative of 
medium term instability. See the review by McKenzie (1999). 
18 We also computed the unconditional (homoskedastic) variance (UV) as a robustness check and the ratios of  
the means of the UVs to the means of the CVs. Since the ratios for both the NEER and bilateral exchange rates 
are all close to unity, the results are robust to both measures.  THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
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‘optimal basket’ based on a range of macroeconomic variables, such as the level of foreign 
debt or imported inflation (see Bird and Rajan, 2002), or are sufficient to ensure stability in 
exchange rate competitiveness in the absence of additional policies to adjust for the gap 
between domestic and foreign inflation. In addition, the hypothetical exchange rate regimes 
operate under ceteris paribus conditions which rule out endogenous responses, such as the 
change in domestic prices due to exchange rate pass-through effects or changes in the 
structure of the economy arising from changes in the direction of trade (fixed trade weights) 





   Table 1 presents annualized conditional standard deviations (ACSD) from the 
ARCH/GARCH daily conditional variances for the actual and hypothetical exchange rate 
regimes. The regimes with the lowest ACSD are highlighted in bold. The regime gains are 
simply the difference between the hypothetical regime and the actual. A large negative value 
signifies a high degree of volatility reduction.  
 
   a. NEER Volatility 
   In terms of the NEER the hypothetical UBP minimizes volatility for all countries and 
provides the highest regime gains compared to actual. The countries which gain most from 
the UBP are those which have higher actual volatility, such as Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, 
Malaysia and Thailand. On the other hand, the gains are lowest for China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan because their actual volatility is relatively low. 
   Although the gains for the CBP are always less than those from the hypothetical UBP, the 
absolute differences between the two regimes appear to be very small. Singapore would give 
up the most gains by switching from a UBP (-5.09) to a CBP (-2.76). The mean for the UBP 
is -11.34 and -10.57 for the CBP and this confirms previous work by Ohno (1999) and 
Williamson, (1998a) and suggests that in volatility terms, at least, the extra costs of a CBP 
may not be substantial and this strengthens the case for a common basket peg for EA 
countries in the longer run.  
   The gains from a hard peg, by contrast, are negligible and zero by definition for the dollar 
peggers. Although there is a gain in mean volatility reduction across the EA9, it is small PETER WILSON AND HENRY NG SHANG REN 
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compared to the basket pegs at -0.41. There might be some benefit to Thailand but it is less 
than half the gains from the basket pegs. 
 
   b. Bilateral Volatility 
   In terms of bilateral exchange rates against the dollar, volatility is zero by definition for the 
hypothetical HP, so the focus is on the basket pegs. Of course under the CBP, since all 
countries peg their currencies to the same set of countries in the basket with the same 
weights, volatility will be the same for all countries so intra-EA9 exchange rates are constant. 
But the gains compared to actual can still differ between the two regimes. If EA9 adopt 
UBPs, their own NEERs will be stabilized but intra-EA9 exchange rates will continue to 
fluctuate.
19  The question then arises as to whether EA countries gain an additional or net 
benefit of relatively stable intra-bloc exchange rates against the dollar if they were to adopt a 
UBP. In other words, is there a trade-off between reducing instability in the NEER with a 
UBP but simultaneously increasing instability against the dollar and thus against other EA 
countries? 
   For the dollar peggers, China and Hong Kong which, by definition, have low bilateral 
instability but relatively high instability in their NEERs there would be little to gain if they 
were to adopt a UBP to stabilize the NEER net of the effect this would have on bilateral 
instability (Table 2 and Figure 2). Apart from the dollar peggers, there appears to be no 
obvious trade-off between the two since high (low) volatility in bilateral terms tends to be 
closely associated with high (low) volatility in the NEER. China and Hong Kong would gain 
little if they were to adopt a UBP (or CBP) to stabilize the NEER net of the effect this would 
have on bilateral instability but for the rest of the sample the gains from the baskets could be 
quite significant since a fall in effective instability would be accompanied by a fall in 
bilateral instability. Moreover, these results also apply to a CBP. 
    
5. CONCLUSION 
 
   The objective of this paper has been to carry out a counterfactual analysis of the impact of 
alternative exchange rate regimes on the volatility of the NEER and the bilateral rate against 
the US$ for nine East Asian countries after the Asian financial crisis. Our counterfactuals 
include a UBP, a CBP, and a hard peg against the US$, but in contrast to previous THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
  11
counterfactual exercises, such as Williamson (1998a) and Ohno (1999) which compute the 
weights for effective exchange rates on the basis of simple bloc aggregates, we apply a more 
disaggregated methodology using a larger number of trade partners. We also utilize 
ARCH/GARCH techniques to obtain estimates of heteroskedastic variances to better capture 
the time-varying characteristics of volatility for the actual and simulated exchange rate 
regimes.  
   Our counterfactuals suggest that, as far as exchange rate volatility is concerned, a basket is 
‘best’ insofar as the hypothetical UBP minimizes NEER volatility for all countries and 
provides the highest regime gains compared to actual. In terms of bilateral rates against the 
dollar there are also gains for the non-dollar peggers since a fall in effective instability would 
be accompanied by a fall in bilateral instability. These gains also follow through for the CBP. 
Although the gains are always less than those from the hypothetical UBP the absolute 
differences between the two regimes appear to be very small. This confirms previous work by 
Ohno (1999) and Williamson, (1998a) and suggests that in volatility terms, at least, the extra 
costs of a CBP may not be substantial and this strengthens the case for a common basket peg 
for EA countries in the longer run 
   Of course the counterfactuals in this paper operate under highly restrictive conditions and in 
practical terms a common currency peg in EA seems unlikely in the immediate future. 
Although there is now a significant amount of intra-bloc trade and investment, financial 
integration has tended to lag behind and the economic and political preconditions for a 
common monetary policy are not sufficiently present, and it is not at all clear empirically that 
the benefits would outweigh the costs. A CBP is also made more difficult by the greater 
openness of international capital markets today compared to the situation facing Europe in 
the past. Some policymakers in the region do, however, appear to be concerned about the 
effects of exchange rate changes and intra-bloc currency instability on their competitive 
positions
20 and this should provide some scope for a continuing dialogue about exchange rate 
issues which might lead to a common exchange rate mechanism in the future. 
 
    
APPENDIX 
                                                                                                                                                     
19 These can be calculated from the bilateral exchange rates since all the EA9 exchange rates are expressed in 
relation to the U.S dollar. 
20 At the annual ADB meeting in South Korea in May 2004 it was accepted that a monetary union was a long 
way off but there was some concern about the damage that intra-bloc currency fluctuations were having on 
regional trade and investment flows and that more research needed to be done on this issue.  PETER WILSON AND HENRY NG SHANG REN 
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   a. ARCH-GARCH Estimates 
   The procedure involved estimating the mean equation and the conditional variance 
simultaneously using the maximum likelihood method. The first step was to select the best 
fitting autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model for the mean equation 
using the Schwartz Bayesian criterion (SBC) and to test for the presence of serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals using the Ljung- Box Q statistic. The ARIMA model was 
chosen since the coefficients of the lag terms in the autoregressive moving average (ARMA) 
model are close to unity. Having determined the best fitting ARIMA model, the Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test was used to check for ARCH disturbances by regressing the squared 
residuals 
2










2 ε α α ε         ( 1 )  
where  t u is a white noise process. If ARCH or GARCH disturbances are non-existent, the 







2 ε α  should be zero, indicating a constant variance of 0 α .  
An ARCH (q) process models the conditional variance as an autoregressive (AR) process 
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Where  t v is a white noise process and is independent of  t u . Equation (2) implies that the 
conditional variance of  t ε is dependent on the realized values of all the
2
i t − ε . Thus volatility 
in previous periods tends to persist and influence the conditional variance in the present 
period. 
   The GARCH (p,q) model differs from the ARCH (q) model in that it allows for both 
autoregressive and moving average components in the conditional variance  t h . For example, 
a GARCH (p,q) model based on the log of first differences of the exchange rate series R and 
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1 ε α  (the ARCH terms) are interpreted 







1 β  (the GARCH terms) are last 
period’s forecast variance, implying a form of adaptive learning behaviour.  
ARCH and GARCH processes were then compared using the SBC, and the best fitting model 
was selected to obtain the mean conditional variance.  
 
   b. Data and Sources 
   Average monthly exchange rates and CPI data to calculate the monthly NEER and REER 
figures for graphical purposes were taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
China’s CPI was downloaded from the Asian Development Bank’s Asia Recovery 
Information Centre and Taiwan’s exchange rate and CPI figures were obtained from the 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, the Republic of China. All the CPI figures are spliced together 
with July 1995 as the base month. Unfortunately Australian CPI data is published only on a 
quarterly basis so the quarterly figures were interpolated using a cubic spline with the last 
observation matched to the source data. Average daily exchange rate data for the ARCH and 
GARCH estimates were downloaded using DataStream International 2000 DataStream 
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TABLE 1 





Actual UBP  CBP  HP 
China                  Volatility  4.94  0.51  0.77 4.94 
                           Gain  -  -4.43  -4.17 0 
Hong Kong         Volatility  4.23  0.49  0.81 4.23 
                           Gain  -  -3.74  -3.42 0 
Indonesia            Volatility  31.34  0.50  1.51 31.32 
                           Gain  -  -30.84  -29.83 -0.02 
Korea                 Volatility  11.69  0.54  1.20 11.69 
                           Gain  -  -11.15  -10.49 0 
Malaysia            Volatility  21.91  0.56  1.21 22.58 
                          Gain  -  -21.35  -20.7 0.67 
Philippines        Volatility    10.83  0.55  1.09 10.77 
                          Gain  -  -10.28  -9.74 -0.06 
Singapore          Volatility  5.94  0.85  3.18 5.83 
                          Gain  -  -5.09  -2.76 -0.11 
Taiwan              Volatility  6.19  0.52  0.78 6.08 
                          Gain   -  -5.67  -5.41 -0.11 
Thailand            Volatility  10.07  0.51  1.46 5.99 
                          Gain  -  -9.56  -8.61 -4.08 
   Mean              Volatility  11.9  0.56  1.33 11.49 
                           Gain  -  -11.34  -10.57 -0.41 
BILATERAL:        
China                 Volatility  0.07  4.51 4.82  - 
                          Gain  - 4.44  4.75  - 
Hong Kong       Volatility  0.19  3.81 4.82  - 
                          Gain  - 3.62  4.63  - 
Indonesia          Volatility  30.76 5.79  4.82 - 
                         Gain  - -24.97  -25.94 - 
Korea                Volatility  10.63 5.39  4.82 - 
                         Gain  - -5.24  -5.81 - 
Malaysia          Volatility  23.23 4.96  4.82 - 
                         Gain  - -18.27  -18.41 - 
Philippines      Volatility  10.50 4.89  4.82 - 
                        Gain  - -5.61  -5.68 - 
Singapore         Volatility  6.74 5.21  4.82 - 
                        Gain  - -1.53  -1.92 - 
Taiwan            Volatility  4.52  5.02 4.82  - 
                        Gain   - 0.5  0.3  - 
Thailand          Volatility  10.57 5.93  4.82 - 
                       Gain  - -4.64  -5.75 - 
   Mean           Volatility  10.8 50.57  4.82   
                       Gain    -5.74  -5.98   




The Trade-Off between Basket Pegs and Bilateral Volatility 
 
 
Net Gain  UBP  CBP 
China  0.01 0.58
Hong Kong  -0.12 1.21
Indonesia  -55.81 -55.77
Korea  -16.39 -16.3
Malaysia  -39.62 -39.11
Philippines  -15.89 -15.42
Singapore  -6.62 -4.68
Taiwan  -5.17 -5.11
Thailand  -14.2 -14.36
     Mean  -17.09 -16.55
 
  Note: the net gain is the reduction in volatility (ACSD) from the basket peg compared to actual plus the gain or loss in 
bilateral volatility compared to actual. A negative sign implies a gain.  PETER WILSON AND HENRY NG SHANG REN 
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FIGURE 1 
Pre- and Post-Crisis East Asian Exchange Rates 
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FIGURE 2 
The Trade-Off in Gains from Basket Pegs 
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